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Doing It with Mirrors: New York v.
United States and Constitutional
Limitations on Federal Power to
Require State Legislation
By MARTIN H. REDISH*
Introduction
In her thoughtful and provocative article appearing in this issue,'
Professor Candice Hoke argues that serious problems of constitu-
tional federalism plague many of the current proposals for federal
health care reform. These proposals, she argues, may run afoul of the
limitations recognized in New York v. United States' on congressional
power to conscript state legislatures into legislative action.'
My goal, in this brief response, is not to critique either Professor
Hoke's careful and detailed examination of the specific health care
proposals 4 or her equally careful exploration of the implications of the
New York decision for those proposals.' My focus, rather, is on the
accuracy of the New York decision as a construction of the Constitu-
tion's protections of federalism-an issue which, I believe, deserves
considerably more attention than Professor Hoke has devoted to it.
For in New York v. United States, the Court imposed constitutional
limits on congressional power that derive from nowhere in the text of
the Constitution.6 As a result, the Court exceeded the legitimate
scope of its authority as an unrepresentative and unaccountable gov-
ernmental organ in a democratic society.7
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern Uni-
versity. J.D. 1970, Harvard University, A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
3. Hoke, supra note 1, at 493.
4. Id. at 496-526.
5. Id. at 550-73.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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The basic constitutional fallacy in Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion is her equation of two very different methods for determining
the scope of constitutional protection of federalism. One of those
methods, traditionally described as the "dual federalism"' or "en-
clave" 9 model, asks whether an action of the federal government un-
duly interferes with or impinges upon a defined area of state sover-
eignty.10 The second method, which could be characterized as the
"enumerated powers" model, recognizes no separate enclave of state
sovereign power but instead inquires only whether the challenged ac-
tion falls within the scope of the federal government's enumerated
powers." Justice O'Connor begins her analysis with the assumption
that it matters not at all which of these two modes of constitutional
interpretation the Court chooses to employ, because "the two inquir-
ies are mirror images of each other."' 2 This premise, however, is to-
tally false; significant practical consequences flow from a reviewing
court's choice between these two interpretive methodologies.' 3 Be-
cause she blurs this fundamental point, Justice O'Connor is able to
choose between the conceivable models of constitutional federalism
while at the same time denying that any choice need be made.' 4 In
doing so, she has chosen a model unauthorized by unambiguous con-
stitutional text.'5 Moreover, on a more practical level, Justice
O'Connor's analysis may threaten the venerable practices of "interac-
tive federalism," which allow the federal government to utilize state
governments in the attainment of social goals.' 6
The fact that Justice O'Connor deserves criticism for overpro-
tecting state sovereignty, however, does not mean that the Constitu-
tion should be construed to impose absolutely no limits on federal
authority to usurp state power. To the contrary, the concept of enu-
merated powers was quite consciously chosen as a means of constitu-
8. See generally Edward Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. Rlv. 1
(1950); see infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
9. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. RV. 693, 702
(1974).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
11. See Ely, supra note 9, at 700-06; see infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
12. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 39-51.
14. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2417; see infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
15. See infra text accompanying note 39-40.
16. See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decisions:
A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REv. 861 (1985); See infra text accompanying
notes 49-50.
tionally assuring the continuation of a federal system.'7 While this
method provides no special protection to state governments from the
imposition of federal burdens, it does assure an exclusive sphere of
control for state power."8 To be sure, the scope of that sphere has
been dramatically reduced with the modem expansion of interstate
travel and communications. But, by its terms, the Constitution effec-
tively prohibits the total consumption of state authority by the asser-
tion of federal power.19 Modem Supreme Court doctrine, however,
has all but achieved that end, in practical terms if not in name. Rather
than invent otherwise non-existent constitutional protections of state
governments, the Court would be better advised to devote serious at-
tention to redefining the modem constitutional limits on the reach of
federal power.
L Constitutional Federalism and New York v. United States
A. The Decision in New York
New York involved a challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,20 which imposed upon states,
either alone or in regional compacts with other states, an obligation to
provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their
borders. The Act contained three sets of so-called "incentives" to
states in order to encourage compliance. The New York Court held
one of those incentives-the "take title" provision-to be unconstitu-
tional. That provision purported to offer the states a "choice" be-
tween either accepting ownership of nuclear waste or adopting
regulations in accordance with Congress' directives.2' Justice
O'Connor 'reasoned that the federal government lacked authority
either to transfer radioactive waste from generators to state govern-
17. See Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. IEv. 1, 12-15 (1987); See infra text
accompanying notes 58-62.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 64-86.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 63-67.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-j (1993).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) states:
If... a State... in which low-level radioactive waste is generated is unable to
provide for the disposal of all such waste generated within such State ... each
State in which such waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or
owner of the waste, shall take title to the waste, shall be obligated to take posses-
sion of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly in-
curred by such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to
take possession of the waste as soon after January 1, 1993 as the generator or
owner notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment.
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ments or to require states to adopt specific legislation.2 She then con-
cluded that "[b]ecause an instruction to state governments to take title
to waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress,
... it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice
between the two."' '
B. Adopting a Method of Constitutional Analysis for Federalism
Issues: The Fallacy of the "Mirror Image" Approach to
Constitutional Federalism
The Constitution imposes two types of limitations on federal
power. The initial form of restriction is a type of "checklist" limita-
tion: the federal government possesses only those powers given to it.
An exercise of power not found to fall somewhere on that constitu-
tional checklist is beyond the scope of federal power, and therefore
unconstitutional.24 But an exercise of governmental authority falling
within that checklist is not necessarily constitutionally valid. Such an
exercise of power may also run afoul of a distinct constitutional "en-
clave"-i.e., an affirmative protection of a specified activity or area of
conduct. For example, were Congress to enact a law making it a crime
for anyone writing in a newspaper sold in interstate commerce to criti-
cize the President of the United States, the "checklist" requirement
would be satisfied, because-at least under modern interpreta-
tions2 5-this law would fall within Congress' enumerated power to
regulate interstate commerce.26 Such a law would nevertheless be un-
constitutional, however, because it would quite clearly run afoul of the
First Amendment's "enclave" protecting freedom of the press.27
In the area of constitutional federalism, the Supreme Court has
often struggled to comprehend and apply this seemingly basic princi-
ple of constitutional interpretation. The only realistically conceivable
textual grounding for a distinct enclave of state sovereignty28 is the
Tenth Amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
22. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
23. Id.
24. See Ely, supra note 9, at 701-02.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that if Congress is
regulating interstate commerce, the fact that it has a non-commerce motivation does not
render the regulation unconstitutional).
26. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, cl. 4.
28. Another conceivable textual basis is the so-called Guarantee Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 4. However, Justice O'Connor declined to reach that issue. New York, 112 S. Ct.
at 2432-33. See infra text accompanying notes 52-57.
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 9 As John
Hart Ely has quite correctly pointed out, "it could hardly be clearer
that the question of what matters are to be left exclusively to the
states is to be answered not by reference to some state enclave con-
struct but rather by looking to see what is not on the federal check-
list."3 The point, in other words, is that, by its terms, the Tenth
Amendment defines state sovereignty exclusively by reference to the
scope of federal power; to decide if a particular authority belongs ex-
clusively to the states, one must inquire whether that authority has
been delegated to the federal government.3 ' If-and only if-the
Court finds that the authority in question has not been delegated to
the federal government will it conclude that that authority is reserved
for exclusive state use. This method of resolving questions of constitu-
tional federalism is to be contrasted to the "dual federalism" model,
premised on a political theory of federalism that posits mutually ex-
clusive spheres of authority for state and federal governments.32
Under this analysis, the Court initially inquires whether the govern-
mental action in question has traditionally been performed by the
states. If the answer is yes, then, under the logic of "dual federalism,"
it follows that that activity must be deemed to fall outside the scope of
federal power.33
Though Justice O'Connor would have us believe that no practical
consequences flow from the choice between these modes of constitu-
tional analysis,34 the history of Supreme Court decisions makes quite
29. U.S. CONS. amend. X.
30. Ely, supra note 9, at 702.
31. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. Other provisions of the Constitution also vest power in
either the federal government in general or in Congress in particular. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (giving Congress power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
32. See generally Corwin, supra note 8. Another commentator has described "dual
federalism" as envisioning "two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power-
that of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each other
as equals across a precise constitutional line, defiming their respective jurisdictions." AL-
PHEUS MASON, FEDERALISM: THE ROLE OF THE COURT, in FEDERALISM: INFINrrE VARI-
T IN THEORY AND PRACrICE 24-25 (V. Earle ed., 1968).
33. An illustration of the Supreme Court's reliance on the dual federalism model in
constitutional analysis is Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See infra note 35.
34. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417. Justice O'Connor reasoned that "the two inquir-
ies are mirror images of each other," because "if a power is an attribute of state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has
not conferred on Congress." Id.
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clear that her assumption is inaccurate. 5 Justice O'Connor began her
analysis in New York with the assertion that "if a power is an attribute
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessar-
ily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. ' 36 While
Justice O'Connor purported to adhere to the "checklist" approach of
United States v. Darby,37 she ultimately slipiped into a distinct "en-
clave" mode:
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limita-
tions contained in the Constitution. Thus, for example, under
the Commerce Clause Congress ... is constrained in the exer-
cise of that power by the First Amendment. The Tenth Amend-
ment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which...
is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment con-
firms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to
limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.
The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this
case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a
limitation on Article I power. 8
By expressly analogizing the Tenth Amendment to the "enclave" limit
of the First Amendment, Justice O'Connor made clear her choice in
favor of the "enclave" version of the Tenth Amendment. What re-
mains shrouded in mystery, however, is how she manages to derive
this construction from the text of that amendment. Her conclusion is
quite puzzling, because she openly concedes that the amendment's
language provides absolutely no basis for such a construction.39 Yet
she does not purport to find this constitutional enclave for state sover-
eignty in the vague implicit interstices of the Constitution, but rather
in the Tenth Amendment itself.
By effectively embodying the "enclave" approach, Justice
O'Connor's analytical model turns the text of the Tenth Amendment
on its head. Instead of defining state sovereignty exclusively by refer-
ence to the scope of power given to Congress-a method that calls for
traditional interpretive analysis of Congress' enumerated powers-
Justice O'Connor instead would have a reviewing court decide the
35. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (using inquiry that looks first
to what powers are reserved to the states to find federal regulation of private activity un-
constitutional) with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (using approach that looks
initially at scope of congressional power under Article I to find federal regulation of pri-
vate activity constitutional).
36. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
37. Id. at 2418.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.
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scope of state sovereign power without reference to any guiding direc-
tive derived, even at the most primitive level, from constitutional text.
More significantly, her inquiry will almost certainly impose limits on
federal power that could not be derived solely from an analysis of
Congress' enumerated powers. If a reviewing court first asks whether
the federal action infringes some predetermined enclave of state sov-
ereignty, it will matter not at all whether that particular action would
have been found to fall within the scope of Congress' enumerated
powers. If, on the other hand, the reviewing court asks only whether
the challenged action falls within Congress' enumerated powers, re-
gardless of its impact on the exercise of state authority, then the scope
of permissible federal power will undoubtedly be substantially
broader.
Such a result should hardly be surprising. The entire purpose of a
constitutional enclave is to impose limits on governmental power over
and above the limits inherent in a checklist approach. Thus, by view-
ing the Tenth Amendment as something more than what its text dem-
onstrates unambiguously that it is-a reaffirmation of the limits on
federal power inherent in the checklist approach 4P-a reviewing court
will inevitably be imposing limits on federal power that extend far be-
yond those inherent in the concept of enumeration.
This conclusion is confirmed by examining Justice O'Connor's ap-
plication of the state sovereignty enclave in New York. There, she
concluded, "While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Na-
tion directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress's instruc-
tions."'41 Despite the fact that such a conclusion may well flow from
use of an enclave model (though, once again, we cannot be sure be-
cause of the total absence of any textual guidance),4 2 it is by no means
clear that it would follow solely from an examination of the scope of
the congressional powers contained in Article I. Nothing in that
enumeration automatically excludes from federal power the option of
requiring states to implement federal policy choices by the adoption of
legislation.
If one were actually to employ the "checklist" model in order to
decide whether the exercise of such an authority falls within the scope
of Congress' enumerated powers, one would necessarily have to in-
40. See discussion supra at notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
41. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421.
42. See discussion supra at notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
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quire whether Congress' commerce power,43 combined with its ancil-
lary authority provided in the Necessary and Proper Clause, 44
authorizes Congress to require states to implement legislation to ac-
complish congressional goals concerning the regulation of nuclear
waste. If only as a doctrinal matter, it today appears clear that Con-
gress' ability to invoke auxiliary authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause is broad indeed4 5-quite probably too broad. Giving
Congress unlimited discretion to conclude that particular actions are
"necessary and proper" to aid in the attainment of a regulatory goal
that falls within one of its enumerated powers-as Chief Justice Mar-
shall appeared to do in McCulloch v. Maryland,46 and as the modern
day Commerce Clause cases involving regulation of private activity
have all but uniformly done4V-effectively repeals the enumerated
powers concept as a limit on federal power, replacing it with a blank
check of federal power, in direct contravention of the concept of enu-
merated powers. However, even if a reviewing court were to deem
itself competent, in an extreme case, to question a congressional judg-
ment that a particular action constitutes a reasonable means of facili-
tating the exercise of an enumerated power, it is not unreasonable, in
a democratic system, to provide Congress broad leeway in deciding
how best to attain its permissible regulatory goals.
Viewed from this "checklist" perspective, it is by no means clear
that the "take-title" provision invalidated in New York falls outside
Congress' authority. Apparently no one questioned that Congress
possesses the authority, under the commerce power, to regulate or
require the disposal of nuclear waste, even to the point of total pre-
emption of any state regulatory power.48 Hence, Congress could rea-
son that while its ultimate goal was to safely and efficiently dispose of
nuclear waste, different areas of the country may require different ap-
43. U.S. CONS. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (empowering Congress "[to] make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers ...
45. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) ("[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is
really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.").
47. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), infra at notes 76-86 and ac-
companying text.
48. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419-20 ("Petitioners do not contend that Congress
lacks the power to regulate the disposal of low level radioactive waste .... Regulation of
the... interstate market [in the sale of space in radioactive waste disposal sites] is... well
within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.").
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proaches to the effective attainment of that goal.49 As a practical mat-
ter, Congress itself cannot be expected to devise all of those
individualized solutions. That fact, however, does not alter either
Congress' ultimate goal of having the problem dealt with legislatively
throughout the nation, or its constitutional power to establish that
goal.
Hence, Congress could conclude that while the problem of nu-
clear waste must be resolved, it should be up to each state to deter-
mine the best method for disposing of that waste. The initial
judgment of whether government will assume the obligation of dispos-
ing of nuclear waste, however, had already been made by Congress.
Thus the state legislatures had been denied the opportunity to con-
clude that the problem did not require governmental resolution; they
were, however, delegated the discretion (or responsibility, if one pre-
fers) to develop the optimum method for doing so in their respective
states. Effectively coercing such state legislation could well constitute
a very logical method of resolving the congressional dilemma. Viewed
from this perspective, then, the "take-title" provision appears to fall
within the scope of Congress' "checklist" of powers.
It is true, of course, that Congress' choice is not free of practical
or theoretical difficulties. Initially, it is undoubtedly true that, as a
result of the federal statute, state legislatures are coerced into taking
legislative action that they might otherwise not have chosen to take.
But this fact rises to the level of constitutional concern only if one
initially assumes the existence of a distinct enclave of state govern-
mental integrity that is to be insulated from federal imposition.50 As
49. On this subject the Court wrote,
Faced with the possibility that the Nation would be left with no disposal sites for
low level radioactive waste, Congress responded by enacting [in 1980] the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act .... Congress declared a federal policy of
holding each State "responsible for providing for the availability of capacity
either within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste
generated within its borders," and found that such waste could be disposed of
most efficiently ... on a regional basis.
Id. at 2415 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50. It has recently been argued that the term "proper" in the Necessary and Proper
Clause should be construed to incorporate concerns about such matters as state sover-
eignty. See Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdiction Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUiKE L.J.267, 267, 271-72 (1993). If
this argument were accepted, something approaching Justice O'Connor's "enclave" analy-
sis could be employed solely under an examination of the scope of congressional power.
However, the term has never been given such a construction judicially. Moreover, such a
construction seems counterintuitive, given the fact that the clause's context in Article I
underscores its role as a facilitator of the exercise of governmental power. Perhaps a more
reasonable construction of the word "proper" would be one that makes clear that the
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already noted,5' by its terms the Tenth Amendment unambiguously
fails to provide such constitutional protection.
Interpretation of the one constitutional provision that could con-
ceivably be construed to provide some sort of protection of state gov-
ernmental integrity against federal incursion, the Guarantee Clause, 2
expressly avoided by Justice O'Connor.53 While the Clause's interpre-
tation could probably have been avoided in any event under the
"political question" doctrine, 4 were one willing to peer beyond the
screen erected by the political question doctrine and examine the
clause's wording, one might argue that by imposing upon the federal
government a burden to guarantee the continuation of a republican
form of government in the states, a fortiori the clause requires that the
federal government itself not so burden the state governments as to
effectively destroy their republican character. At most, however, this
reasoning would prevent the federal government from all but destroy-
ing the state governments. Conscription of state legislatures in the
manner contemplated in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act could hardly be deemed to rise to that level.
One might argue that by requiring a state legislature to enact leg-
islation that it would not otherwise enact, Congress is subverting the
representative and accountability processes that are central to the
concept of republican government.5 5 But when one recalls that Con-
gress unquestionably has constitutional power to preempt all state
regulation (or non-regulation) of nuclear waste, regardless of the con-
trary will of particular state legislatures,56 the "non-republican" aspect
of the "take-title" provision appears less damning. Ultimately, the
primary regulatory policy choice is made by Congress and the Presi-
dency, which are both representative and accountable. In the tradi-
tion of "interactive" federalism,57 state legislatures are "conscripted"
to enact implementing legislation, and to the extent they have free-
clause is not intended to authorize Congress to breach express textual limits on congres-
sional power.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a republican form of government .....
53. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2433.
54. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding Guarantee Clause
claims non-justiciable). I have previously criticized this doctrine. See MARMN H. REDisH,
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL THEORY 111-36 (1991). Justice O'Connor left the "political question" is-
sue unresolved in New York. 112 S. Ct. at 2433.
55. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421-23.
56. See discussion supra text accompanying note 48.
57. See generally Redish, supra note 16.
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dom to shape the method of achieving that federal policy choice to the
specific needs of their states they, too, are acting in a representative
and accountable manner.
C. Constitutional Text and Original Intent
Justice O'Connor justified her conclusion that the federal govern-
ment could not require state legislation in part based on her finding
that the Framers consciously chose not to authorize such a practice.5
At least to a certain extent, however, she appears to have turned his-
tory on its head. By Justice O'Connor's acknowledgement, 59 the his-
tory to which she points concerns primarily the Framers' decision to
depart from prior practice under the Articles of Confederation, which
required Congress to act through state legislatures.60 There is, of
course, all the difference in the world between requiring Congress to
act only through state legislatures on the one hand and permitting
Congress to do so.
Though it has recently been argued that Justice O'Connor's un-
derstanding of the Framers' intent is largely accurate, 61 even if true
this fact is largely beside the point. Unless the Framers actually em-
bodied their goal in constitutional text, that goal has no constitutional
status because it has not been subjected to the ratification process;
only the text has received such treatment. At most,62 original intent
can play a role in interpreting ambiguous constitutional text. In the
-case of congressional power to require state legislation, even if Justice
O'Connor's conclusion as to the Framers' intent were correct, no pro-
vision of constitutional text can even arguably be thought to embody
the Framers' goal. If the Framers had in fact decided that Congress
could not require state legislation, one would think that they would
have included an explicit prohibition on such a power in the text. At
the very least, they could reasonably have been expected to insert
some special protection of state sovereignty, framed in general terms.
With the possible exception of the Guarantee Clause, they did neither.
Indeed, when, in the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution's drafters
58. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423.
59. Id. at 2421-23.
60. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1447
(1987).
61. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957
(1993).
62. It has been argued that Framers' intent should not control modem textual inter-
pretation, because it is impossible to know how that intent might have changed in light of
subsequent developments. See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132
U. PA. L. Rnv. 445 (1984).
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finally did make some reference to protection of the states, it was only
to reaffirm the concept of enumerated federal powers. Thus, the his-
tory to which Justice O'Connor points-even if it were not as ques-
tionable as it appears-cannot support a finding of a prohibition on
federal power to require state legislation.
H. Revising the Focus of Constitutional Federalism
The fact that Congress may conscript state governments in an ef-
fort to attain social policy goals within the scope of its constitutionally
defined authority does not mean that the Constitution and the Court
are to play no role in preserving the values of federalism. By its un-
ambiguous textual structure, the Constitution manifests its goal of
preserving the basic notion of federalism. It does so, not by erecting
an enclave to shield state governments from federal imposition, but by
limiting the reach of federal power to control private activity. Article
I, section 8 enumerates particular congressional powers,63 and, as
Chief Justice Marshall wisely pointed out, the concept of enumeration
necessarily implies something not enumerated. 64
To be sure, the Necessary and Proper Clause65 provides Congress
with a significant degree of flexibility in the invocation of those enu-
merated powers.66 But this provision cannot be read to convert Arti-
cle I's enumeration into a blank check of authority issued to the
federal government, without ignoring the inescapable implications of
that provision's text. Equally important, it cannot do so without, at
the very least, threatening (if not directly undermining) the political
and social values traditionally thought to be fostered by use of a fed-
eral system: the diffusion of power and the resultant reduction in the
danger of tyranny, the promotion of social diversity, and the attain-
ment of the benefits of governmental experimentation.67
A. The Scope of the Commerce Clause
One might reasonably wonder whether one can reconcile the
maintenance of a sphere of private activity that is constitutionally
deemed beyond the reach of federal power with the obvious fact of
modern life that the scope of that power must expand as interstate
63. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
64. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
66. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
67. I discuss these values in more detail in MARTIN H. REDISH, Tim CoNsrrr-rxoN As
POLITICAL STRucruRE (Oxford University Press) (forthcoming 1994).
technology, communication, and travel expand. The answer to that
question may be derived from a critical examination of modem Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence.
Because of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supreme Court
has long held-quite correctly-that the mere fact that congressional
regulation is not itself directly concerned with interstate commerce is
not constitutionally fatal, as long as the regulation will ultimately have
a non-trivial impact upon interstate commerce.68 Problems arise,
however, in determining whether, in fact, this is the case.
I have discussed one of these problems, specifically, the appropri-
ate level of judicial scrutiny where Congress concludes that regulation
of activity not falling within interstate commerce will actually have a
measurable impact on interstate commerce, in previous writing.69 An
additional problem is created by what could be described as the "class
of activities" doctrine, first articulated in United States v. Darby.7 °
There the Court construed certain provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 193871 to apply to "an employer engaged.., in the man-
ufacture and shipment of goods in filling orders of extrastate
customers, [who] manufactures his product with the intent or expecta-
tion that according to the normal course of his business all or some
part of it will be selected for shipment to those customers,' 72 even if
ultimately the product was shipped only intrastate.
Congress was not unaware that most manufacturing businesses
shipping their product in interstate commerce make it in their
shops without reference to its ultimate destination and then af-
ter manufacture select some of it for shipment interstate and
some intrastate according to the daily demands of their business,
and that it would be practically impossible, without disrupting
manufacturing businesses, to restrict the prohibited kind of pro-
duction to the particular pieces of lumber, cloth, furniture or the
like which later move in interstate rather than intrastate
Commerce.73
In so holding, the Court relied on the decision in the so-called Shreve-
port Case74 for the proposition that Congress may regulate "intrastate
transactions which are so commingled with or related to interstate
68. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
69. See Redish & Drizin, supra note 17, at 41-49, discussing the proper scope of the
Court's "rational basis" test.
70. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1993).
72. Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
73. Id. at 117-18.
74. Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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commerce that all must be regulated if the interstate commerce is to
be effectively controlled."'
Such a conclusion appears to represent a reasonable construction
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as applied to Congress' Com-
merce Power. When it is impractical for Congress to separate those
members of the regulated class who are in interstate commerce from
those who are not, Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
could not be effectively exercised unless Congress is allowed also to
regulate those members of the class who do not affect interstate
commerce.
It should not follow, however, that Congress may rely on this
logic when the two elements of the class are not so intermingled as to
render regulation of only the interstate element impractical. The dan-
ger in the use of the "class of activities" doctrine, then, is that Con-
gress will rely on it to regulate all elements of a subject class, including
those that are not in interstate commerce, even when the drawing of a
regulatory distinction would not be truly impractical.
A possible illustration of such unacceptable bootstrapping is Pe-
rez v. United States.76 There the defendant had been convicted of
"loan sharking" activities in violation of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act.77 The defendant argued that Congress could not reach his
activities under the Commerce Clause, because all of his activities had
been conducted intrastate. The Court, relying heavily on Darby, up-
held the conviction because the defendant "is clearly a member of the
class which engages in 'extortionate credit transactions' as defined by
Congress... . ,71 The Court concluded, "Where the class of activities
is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the
class."'79 The question, however, is why does the Court not have the
obligation to "excise" such activities, unless Congress can establish
that separation would be impractical? After all, unless the members
of the class are thus intermingled, the entire rationale for congres-
sional regulation of the members not themselves in interstate com-
merce disappears.
75. Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.
76. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1993).
78. Perez, 402 U.S. at 153 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 154 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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B. An Alternative Method for Ascertaining Impracticality
While finding "impracticality" may present some doctrinal
problems, a relatively simple method of determining impracticality
would be to inquire first whether federal enforcement of Congress'
regulation required an individualized adjudicatory process, and sec-
ond whether all of the subject's regulated activities were intrastate.
Where Congress either has chosen or is constitutionally required to
provide such an individualized process, as in the case of criminal pros-
ecutions such as Perez, and the defendant can establish that his own
activities were entirely intrastate (rather than intermingled with inter-
state activities), it surely is not impracticable to separate the members
of the class who can be constitutionally regulated from those who
cannot.
While making such a defense available to a subject of regulation
will no doubt increase the federal regulatory burden somewhat, it will
do so only minimally, especially if the burden of proof is placed on the
subject of regulation to establish that his activities were entirely intra-
state. Though it would of course be more convenient, for purposes of
federal regulation, to allow wholesale grouping of similar activities,
whether or not they all constitute interstate commerce, such conven-
ience would be gained at the price of the concept of limited federal
power. The standard for application of the "class of activities" doc-
trine should be as restrictive as in its first articulation in the Shreve-
port Case: the doctrine should be invoked only where "the interstate
and intrastate transactions ... are so related that the government of
one involves the control of the other ... "80 As Justice Stewart, dis-
senting in Perez, persuasively argued:
[U]nder the statute before us a man can be convicted without
any proof of interstate movement, of the use of the facilities of
interstate commerce, or of facts showing that his conduct af-
fected interstate commerce. I think the Framers of the Constitu-
tion never intended that the National Government might define
as a crime and prosecute such wholly local activity through the
enactment of federal criminal laws. 8 i
The Perez Court also found that "[e]xtortionate credit transac-
tions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress af-
fect interstate commerce," because Congress had found that loan
sharking was "the second largest source of revenue for organized
crime... and is one way by which the underworld obtains control of
80. Houston & Texas Ry., 234 U.S. at 351.
81. 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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legitimate businesses."' But it is in such situations that the Court
must ask itself whether its logic proves too much-in other words,
whether such reasoning would authorize the federalization of all activ-
ity.83 If so, then the Court's reasoning would effectively allow Con-
gress' commerce power, read in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, to consume the textually dictated and politically sound
principle of limited federal power.' As Justice Stewart noted:
[I]t is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem
for all crime is a national problem. It is not enough to say that
some loan sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime
may have an interstate setting. And the circumstance that loan
sharking has an adverse impact on interstate business is not a
distinguishing attribute, for interstate business suffers from al-
most all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the
streets.85
Justice Stewart correctly asserted that "[iun order to sustain this law
we would... have to be able at the least to say that Congress could
rationally have concluded that loan sharking is an activity with inter-
state attributes that distinguish it in some substantial respect from
other local crime. '86
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that even under a much more disci-
plined "class-of-activities" doctrine, Congress would still retain broad
regulatory authority, as it should. But the constitutional values of fed-
eralism that were textually protected by the concept of enumerated
powers still retain importance, and should therefore not be aban-
doned by the Court.
Professor Hoke has performed a truly masterful job of analyzing
potential constitutional problems, under Justice O'Connor's decision
in New York, to which the various health care proposals give rise. She
has, however, neglected to provide Justice O'Connor's opinion the
stinging criticism it so richly deserves. By resorting to an analytical
game of mirrors, Justice O'Connor has managed first to blur and ulti-
mately to ignore the significant practical consequences that flow from
the choice between the "checklist" and "enclave" approaches to con-
stitutional federalism. As a result, she has managed to erect a consti-
82. 402 U.S. at 154-55 (footnote omitted).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
85. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
tutional protection of state governments that simultaneously ignores
the unambiguous message of constitutional text and threatens our
long-established traditions of interactive federalism. As a result, it is
an approach that should play no role in a proper construction of con-
stitutional federalism.
The implications for health care reform of my suggested revision
in the focus of constitutional federalism are relatively clear, at least on
a general level. The first question to be asked is whether health care
is a problem that implicates Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. Though the answer to this question should turn on some-
thing more than the cursory inquiry usually provided by the Supreme
Court, it is likely that even under more careful scrutiny Congress
could demonstrate that health care, for the most part, is an industry
involved in interstate commerce, and that it would be impracticable to
require Congress to separate out whatever portion of the industry is
actually intrastate. Hence, pursuant to the "class of activities" doc-
trine, Congress may regulate the entire activity.
The question of whether or not Congress, in regulating national
health care, may require enactment of implementing state legislation
gives rise to a different set of constitutional issues. Under my sug-
gested revision, the sole constitutional question would be whether the
congressional imposition of such a requirement fits within Congress'
auxiliary power created by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The an-
swer to that question, in turn, would be heavily influenced by the level
of deference that the reviewing court employs. If the court were to
give Congress virtual carte blanche in deciding how to exercise one of
its enumerated powers, then a finding of unconstitutionality is all but
unthinkable. If, however, the court demands that Congress make at
least some showing of the need for implementing state legislation,
then the issue of constitutionality may be in more doubt. Even under
this more probing standard of review, however, it is unlikely that the
congressional judgment would be overturned. If democratic govern-
ment is to function, Congress must be allowed to exercise a wide
range of discretion in deciding how to employ its powers most
effectively.
I leave to others who are considerably more expert than I am in
such matters the determination of how these constitutional standards
apply to the various health care proposals that have been made to
dateY The key point to keep in mind in making such an inquiry
87. See generally Hoke, supra note 1.
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under my revised approach, however, is that any resulting invasion of
state sovereignty should be deemed irrelevant to the constitutional
analysis. This is not because such considerations should necessarily be
deemed irrelevant as a matter of social or political policy, or because
one could not construct a constitutional federal system that provided
special protections for state sovereignty, but rather because for all
practical purposes nothing in the text of our Constitution supports
such a principle.
